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Abstract— Proxy signature helps the proxy signer to sign
messages on behalf of the original signer. It is very useful when
the original signer (e.g. the president of a company) is not
available to sign a specific document. If the original signer can
not forge valid proxy signatures through impersonating the proxy
signer, it will be robust in a virtual environment; thus the original
signer can not shift any illegal action initiated by herself to the
proxy signer. In this paper, we propose a new proxy signature
scheme. The new scheme can prevent the original signer from
impersonating the proxy signer to sign messages. The proposed
scheme is based on the regular ElGamal signature. In addition,
the fair privacy of the proxy signer is maintained. That means,
the privacy of the proxy signer is preserved; and the privacy can
be revealed when it is necessary.
Keywords: ElGamal signature, Proxy signature, Security, Hash
function, Fair privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
A digital signature is used to establish both of the signer
authenticity and the data integrity assurance. One of the
classic digital signatures is ElGamal signature [1]. Besides
the property of the general digital signature [2], the proxy
signature [3]-[6]-[9] could help the proxy signer to sign
messages on behalf of the original signer. The concept of the
proxy signatures was introduced by Mambo et al. [7]. The
proxy signature is motivated by the scenario: A president of
a company wants to ask his secretary to sign some important
documents on behalf of him. However, the president does not
hope the secretary know any secret information of the private
key. Also, at a later time, any one who verifies the signature
should be confirmed that the secretary signed the document
on behalf of the president.
A number of proxy signature schemes have been proposed
[3]-[6]-[9], [10], [11]. No one ever utilised the ElGamal
signature to apply to the proxy signature design, though the
(regular) ElGamal signature is efficient and powerful. A proxy
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signature scheme is a cryptographic primitive, that contains
three entities: the original signer, the proxy signer and the
verifier (at a later time). It allows the original signer to delegate
her signing capability to a designated proxy signer. The proxy
signer can sign some messages on behalf of the original signer.
After receiving the proxy signature, the verifier, which knows
the public keys of the original and proxy signers, verified the
validity of the proxy signature. Generally, a proxy signature
consists of four algorithms.
System setup: This establishes some public and pri-
vate parameters for the original signer. In some situation, a
pseudonym generation centre is involved in the setup algo-
rithm.
Proxy generation: It outputs a pair of private and public
keys for the proxy signer. The proxy generation usually in-
volves a two-party protocol run between the original and proxy
signers, and between the proxy signer and the pseudonym
generation centre.
Signing: For an input that consists of a message to be signed
and a proxy private key kept by the proxy signer, it outputs a
valid proxy signature.
Verifying: For an input that includes a pair (a message
and a signature) and the public keys of the original and
proxy signers, it helps the verifier to verify the validity of
the signature.
According to the original signer’s control on the private key
of the proxy signer, there exist two different kinds of proxy
signature:
(1) Proxy unprotected proxy signature: Proxy unprotected
proxy signature includes two cases: one is the full delegation,
and the other is partial delegation. In the full delegation, a
proxy signer is given the same private key as the original
signer has, and computes the same signatures as the original
signer does. Therefore, the original signer should take all
the responsibility for messages signed by the proxy signer.
In the partial delegation, the original signer uses her private
key to create a proxy signature key and sends it to the proxy
signer through a secure channel. The proxy signer uses the
proxy signature key to compute proxy signatures on behalf
of the original signer. For the security reason, it must be
computationally infeasible to compute the original signer’s
private key from the proxy signer’s proxy signature key.
(2) Proxy protected proxy signature: Proxy protected proxy
signature includes one case: the delegation of the original
signer by warrant. In the delegation by warrant, the original
signer gives the proxy signer a warrant, which certifies that
the proxy signer is legal. Delegation by warrant is performed
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through a series of executions of signing of the general
digital signature scheme. The proxy signer generates the proxy
signatures not only with the proxy signature key given by
the original signer but also with the private key given by the
pseudonym generation centre. Therefore, the original signer
and the proxy signer share the responsibility for the underlying
valid proxy signatures.
The proxy unprotected proxy signature can be applied to
the scenario: If the president of a company is not available
to sign an important document, he can entrust his secretary
(using the proxy signature scheme) to sign the receipt of the
document on behalf of him. This case is reasonable since the
secretary is the reliable and important employee who belongs
to the company.
The proxy protected proxy signature can be applied to
the scenario: If the president of a company and his reliable
secretary are both not available to sign an important document,
he can entrust an employee (using the proxy signature scheme)
to sign the receipt of the document on behalf of him. This case
is reasonable since this employee may be not the very reliable
employee who belongs to the company. When some illegal
situation related to the underlying proxy signature happens,
the privacy of the proxy signer can be revealed. Another
scenario is that a bank approves its customers to sign bank’s
electronic checks, they need to use the proxy protected proxy
signature. In this situation, the privacy of the customers should
be preserved.
In this paper, we focus on the proxy protected proxy
signatures. The proxy-protected signature scheme satisfies the
following three basic security properties.
Verifiability: From a proxy signature, any verifier can be
convinced of the original signer’s agreement on the signed
message.
Strong unforgeability: Only a designated proxy signer can
create a valid proxy signature for the original signer (even the
original signer cannot do it).
Undeniability: Neither the origin signer nor the proxy signer
must be able to sign in place of the other party. In other words,
they cannot deny their signatures against any verifier.
An interesting issue is: how to preserve the privacy of the
proxy signer? how can then this privacy be revealed when
it is necessary. This paper will address this issue. In this
paper, we propose a new proxy signature scheme. The new
scheme is based on the regular ElGamal signature. Therefore,
its signature generation and verifying are very efficient. Also,
the security of the proposed scheme has the same security level
(existential unforgeability) with the regular ElGamal signature
(i.e. ElGamal signature with hash paddings). In addition, a
very important property - fair privacy is preserved in the new
scheme.
Therefore, among these three types of delegation, the dele-
gation by warrant has the best security and privacy level. This
can be confirmed by:
(1) The full delegation can not provide enough security and
privacy, in that (a) the proxy signer knows the private key of
the original signer; (b) it is probable that the original signer
(or the proxy signer) signs a specific message and repudiate
the signature at a later time to the verifier.
(2) The partial delegation can not provide enough security
and fair privacy, in that the original signer has the full control
on the proxy signing key of the proxy signer, although the
proxy signer does not know the private key of the original
signer compared with the full delegation.
(3) The delegation by warrant can provide enough security
and fair privacy, in that (a) the proxy signer does not know the
private key of the original signer; (b) the original signer has
no full control on the private key of the proxy signer; (c) any
verifier only gets the pseudonym of the proxy signer, but not
the identity; (d) the privacy of the proxy signer is preserved;
and also, the privacy can be revealed when it is necessary.
The organization of the rest of our paper is as follows:
Section 2 introduces the discrete logarithm problem, discrete
logarithm assumption, and the ElGamal signature. Section 3
presents a new proxy signature scheme. This proxy signature
scheme is based on ElGamal signature. Section 4 provides se-
curity analysis and privacy analysis. The performance analysis
is presented in section 5. The concluding remarks are provided
in section 6.
II. PRELIMINARY
In this section, we provide some preliminaries for the
proposed proxy signature scheme. What we present include:
discrete logarithm, discrete logarithm problem, and discrete
logarithm assumption. The security of the new proxy signature
scheme is based on the ElGamal signatures.
A. Discrete Logarithm Problem
(Discrete Logarithm) Discrete Logarithm: Let G be a finite
cyclic group of order n. g is a generator of G (G = 〈g〉), and
let y ∈ G. The discrete logarithm of y to the base g, denoted
logg y, is the unique integer x and x ∈ Zn such that y = gx
Discrete Logarithm Problem (1) DLP: Given a large prime
p, a generator g of Z∗p , and an element y ∈ Z∗p . The discrete
logarithm problem is to find the integer x ∈ Z∗p such that gx =
ymod p. (2) GDLP: Given a finite cyclic group G of order n,
a generator g ∈ G, and an element y ∈ G, the GDLP is to find
the integer x such that gx = y. Algorithms to compute discrete
logarithm include: (1) Arbitrary group: Exhaustive search,
baby-step giant-step, Pollards rho; (2) Group with small prime
factors: Pohlig-Hellman; (3) Index calculus efficient only in
certain groups.
Discrete Logarithm Assumption Given a large prime p
carefully chosen, such that the above algorithms do not work
on the DLP. Let g be a generator of Z∗p , and an element y ∈
Z∗p . Then, it is computationally difficult to find an integer x
such that y = gxmod p.
B. ElGamal Signature
ElGamal Signature Scheme: The ElGamal signature
scheme is as follows: Let p be a prime and let α be a primitive
element in Z∗p . The set of all messages is P = Zp−1, the set
of all signatures C = Zp−1 × Zp−1. And the set of all keys
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K = {(p, α, a, β) : β = αamod p}. p, α, and β make up the
public key; and the private key is a. Alice is the signer, and
Bob is the verifier.
Signing Given a message m,
(1) Alice chooses a number k ∈ Zp−1 randomly, and
computes γ = αkmod p.
(2) Alice computes δ = (m − aγ)(k−1)mod (p − 1).
Then, {γ, δ} is the signature on the message m.
Verifying Given a signature {γ, δ} on a message m, Bob
will do as follows:
(1) Bob computes z = γδβγ .
(2) Bob computes e = αmmod p and checks whether
e = zmod p. If it holds, Bob accepts it as a valid signature.
Otherwise, it is an invalid signature.
Security If the attacker can compute the value a = logα β,
then ElGamal signatures can be forged. As long as p is
chosen carefully and α is a primitive element modulo p, then
solving the Discrete Logarithm problem in Z∗p is infeasible.
Additionally, k must be secret, only used once and random.
As shown above, ElGamal signature can also be used for
encryption as well, but the messages should be relatively small
in size.
It should be noticed that the plain ElGamal signature scheme
is not secure against existential forgery attack. Therefore,
we need to shift it to a much more secure version when
our new proxy signature security is based on the ElGamal
signatures. We have exploited the hash padding technique
in the following proxy signature scheme. We call this new
version of ElGamal signatures the regular ElGamal signatures.
III. NEW PROXY SIGNATURE AS SECURE AS ELGAMAL
SIGNATURE
A. System Setup
There are three entities involving in the proxy signature
scheme: an original signer S, a pseudonym generation centre
(PGC), and a proxy signer P. The original signer will delegate
his signing rights to the proxy signer. To do this, the original
signer needs the help of the pseudonym generation centre. The
proxy signer will first register herself at the pseudonym gen-
eration centre. And then, the PGC will generate a pseudonym,
which is privately linked to the identity of the proxy signer.
This mechanism will help an entity (who is a verifier) to ask
the pseudonym generation centre to identify the proxy signer,
only if the proxy signer abuses his proxy signing right. The
system parameters are as follows:
{p, q, g, L, H(·, ·), idS , idp, idpgc, xs, xpgc, y1, y2}
Here, p and q are two large primes. L is an integer and
512 ≤ L ≤ 1025 . The bit length of p is L. g is an q-order
element and g ∈ Z∗p . ids and idpgc are the identity of the
original signer and the proxy signer, respectively. xs ∈ Z∗q and
xpgc ∈ Z∗q are the private key of the original signer and the
pseudonym generation centre, respectively. y1 ∈ Zp and y2 ∈
Zp are the public key of the original signer and the pseudonym
generation centre, respectively. H(·, ·) is a cryptographic hash
function, H : Zp × {0, 1}∗ → Zq.
B. Proxy Generation
Proxy generation includes three stages: the first stage is the
issuing pseudonym stage; the second stage is the delegation
stage; and the third stage is the proxy signing key generation
stage. The details are as follows:
1) Issuing pseudonym stage: In this stage, the pseudonym
generation centre (PGC) will interact with the proxy signer.
PGC issues a pseudonym np, a public parameter r1 and a
partial secret key s1 to the proxy signer P. The PGC will
record the tuple {np, rp, idp} in its own database, where rp
is a random element chosen by the PGC. The following is
the detail:
(1) The proxy signer P registers her identity idp to the
pseudonym generation centre PGC.
(2) The pseudonym generation centre PGC chooses a ran-
dom element rp ∈ Z∗q and computes np
np = H(idp, rp). (1)
(3) The pseudonym generation centre PGC chooses another




s1 = (kp + xpgcH(np, r1))mod q, (3)
and records the tuple {np, rp, idp} in its own database. This
will help the pseudonym generation centre identify the identity
of the proxy signer in future, when the proxy signer does
something illegal. PGC then sends {np, r1, s1} to P.






If it holds, P will use s1 to compute her proxy signing key in
the third stage (Proxy signing key generation stage) and np
as the pseudonym which is linked to her identity idp.
2) Delegation stage: In this stage, the original signer
S interacts with the proxy signer P. S will delegate P to
sign some messages on behalf of S. To fulfil it, S sends a
partial secret s2, a warrant mw ∈ {0, 1}∗ (mw is required
not to include the identity of the proxy signer), and a public
parameter tS . After receiving the elements, P will verify the
correctness of the tuple. Only if it is correct, P accepts the
delegation. The details are the followings:
World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology 11 2005
29
(1) The original signer S chooses a random number ks ∈
Z∗q , computes tS = g
ksmod p and
s2 = (ks + xsH(tS ,mw))mod q. (5)
And then, S sends the tuple {s2,mw, tS} to P.






If this equality holds, P will accept the delegation from S.
Otherwise, P will not accept.
3) Proxy signing key generation stage: In this stage, the
proxy signer P will construct the proxy signing private key
and public key pair. P utilizes the partial secret keys s1 and
s2 from S and PGC, respectively. The detail is as follows:
(1) P computes s as the proxy signing private key:
s = (s2H(s1, idS) + s1)( mod q) (7)
(2) P computes y = gsmod p as the proxy signing public
key, which will be used in the verifying signatures generated
by the proxy signer on behalf of the original signer. Notice
that the public key y should be certified by the pseudonym
generation centre, in order to maintain the authentication,
integration and non-repudiation. We do not provide the details
of the certificate information, since it can be easily deployed
using the certificate technique in [10].
C. Signature Generation
In this procedure, the proxy signer P will sign messages on
behalf of the original signer. Given a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗,
(1) P chooses k ∈ Z∗p randomly and uniformly, and
computes a,
a = gk(mod p). (8)
(2) P computes z = k−1(mod q) and b
b = z(H(m,mw‖idS‖np) − as)(mod q). (9)
The proxy signer will publish {a, b} as the proxy signature
on the message m. Also, any verifier can get the public
parameters {mw, np} and the identity idS of the original
signer. {mw, np, idS} are associated with the proxy signature
{a, b}.
D. Signature Verifying
The verifier will work on this procedure. Given an alleged
proxy signature {a, b} on a message m, the verifier utilizes
the public key parameters {mw, np} and the identity idS of
the original signer to follow the steps:
(1) The verifier verifies whether a ∈ Zp.
(2) The verifier computes v1 = yaab(mod p).
(3) The verifier computes v2 = gH(m,mw‖idS‖np)mod p.
(4) The verifier accepts the signature as valid if and only if
v1 = v2.
E. Identifying Proxy Signer
If the verifier holds a valid proxy signature
{a,mw, np, b, idS} on a message m, this procedure will help
the verifier to ask the proxy generation centre to identify the
proxy signer if the proxy signer does anything illegal through
using the proxy signing algorithm. To do this, the verifier
first sends the pseudonym np to the proxy generation centre
PGC. After receiving np, PGC checks np = H(rp, idp) by
using the tuple {np, rp, idp} in its own database, and then
PGC can identify the proxy signer.
IV. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
This paper has presented a new proxy signature scheme.
The security of the proposed proxy signature scheme is
based on the regular ElGamal signatures. Besides the strong
unforgeability, the new proxy signature scheme has the fair
identifiability of the proxy signer, the verifiability of proxy
signatures generated by the proxy signer on behalf of the
original signer, and the undeniability of the proxy signer.
Another important point on the proxy signature scheme is that
the privacy of the proxy signer is preserved. The details of the
related proofs are presented as follows:
A. Security Analysis
We will prove that the proposed proxy signature scheme
satisfies the following security properties: (1) strong
unforgeability; (2) fair identifiability; (3) verifiability; and (4)
strong undeniability.
(1) Strong unforgeability. Strong unforgeability means that
the original signer even can not forge valid proxy signatures.
From Equation (2) and (6), we have
s = (s2H(s1, idS) + s1)mod q
= (kp + s2H(s1, idS) + xpgcH(np, r1))mod q. (10)
It is difficult to derive the value of s, since kp and xpgc are
two random and private elements of Z∗q . If the original signer
tries to tackle Equation (1), she will need to solve the discrete
logarithm problem. However, the discrete logarithm problem
is difficult. On the other hand, from Equation (8) and (9), the
proposed proxy signature is based on the ElGamal signature.
Therefore, the strong unforgeability is maintained, since the
hash padding technique is utilized in the proxy signature
generation.
(2) Fair Identifiability. Fair identifiability means that no one
(excluding the pseudonym generation centre and the original
signer) is able to identify the underlying proxy signer only
from a valid proxy signature. An exceptional situation is
the pseudonym generation centre can identify the underlying
proxy signer through the pseudonym. This only takes place
when the proxy signer denies a valid proxy signature (the
verifier has verified that the underlying proxy signature is
valid). In fact, from the proxy signature generated by the proxy
signer
{a,mw, np, b, idS} (11)
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on the message m, any one (excluding the pseudonym
generation centre) cannot identify the proxy signer. This is
because: (a) We have limited the warrant mw not to include
the identity information of the proxy signer. It does not leak
any information of the identity for the proxy signer. And (b)
np = H(idp, rp). Therefore, the identity of the proxy signer
has been encapsulated using a cryptographic hash function.
(3) Verifiability. Verifiability means that any verifier who
holds the related public parameters can check whether a proxy
signature is valid and can be confirmed that the signature
is generated according to the delegation of the original
signer, if the signature is valid. From the Signature Verifying
algorithm in section 3, we know that the verifier utilizes the
public key parameters {mw, np} and the identity idS of the
original signer to verify an alleged proxy signature {a, b} on
a message m. Only if {mw, np} and idS are involved in the
verifying algorithm, and also the signature is really computed
by the proxy signer according to the delegation, the verifier
would be confirmed that the original signer has delegated the
proxy signer to sign the document on behalf of the original
signer.
(4) Undeniability. Undeniability means that the proxy
signer cannot deny she ever generated a valid signature on a
given message on behalf of the original signer. In fact, from
Equation (1) we know that the pseudonym np is information-
theoretically linked to the proxy signer (i.e. her identity).
More importantly, the verifying equation v1 = yaab(mod p)
implies the proxy signer ever generated the signature on the
message.
B. Privacy Analysis
We will prove that the privacy of the proxy signer is
preserved. In fact, it is known that privacy is paramount
particularly in respect to financial situations of the participant.
Therefore, it is necessary to preserve the privacy. There are
three aspects that will be discussed on the privacy: privacy of
the proxy signing private key, privacy of the identity of the
proxy signer, and fair privacy of the proxy signer.
1) Privacy of the proxy signing private key: This privacy is
maintained, since the proxy signer constructs the proxy signing
private key s = (s2H(s1, idS)+s1)( mod q) using the partial
secret elements s1 (from the pseudonym generation centre)
and s2 (from the original signer), respectively. Therefore, the
original signer can not figure out the proxy signing private
key.
2) Privacy of the identity of the proxy signer: This privacy
is maintained, since the identity idp of the proxy signer is
hashed through a secure cryptographic hash function. There-
fore, an attack (excluding S and PGC) can not derive the proxy
singer from the pseudonym np (a public parameter) and a valid
signature {a, b}.
3) Fair Privacy of the proxy signer: Fair privacy means
that the privacy of the proxy signer can be revealed when it
is necessary. Given a valid signature {a, b, np,mw, idS}, the
pseudonym generation centre can identify the proxy signer
using the equation H(idp, rp) = np.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We discuss the computation performance by the following
three procedure: the proxy generation algorithm, the signing
algorithm, and the verifying algorithm.
Proxy generation involves four hash function evaluations,
seven exponentiations modulo p, and three multiplication
modulo p. However, all these computations can be done in
a pre-computed way.
Signing algorithm involves one exponentiation modulo p,
one inversion computation modulo q, two multiplications
modulo q, and one hash function evaluation. Therefore, the
signing algorithm is efficient.
Verifying algorithm involves three exponentiations modulo
p, one multiplication modulo p, and one hash function evalu-
ation.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a new proxy signature scheme.
The proposed scheme is derived from the ElGamal signature.
Therefore, the security (unforgeability) of the proposed proxy
signatures is based on the regular ElGamal signature. Also, the
new scheme has the fair identifiability, the verifiability, and
the undeniability. Since the proxy signer signs some messages
on behalf of the original signer, the fair privacy of the proxy
signer is preserved.
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